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Motivation has been of interest to psychological researchers going back as far a Kurt 
Lewin (1936), but recent advances using the “New Look” in motivation paradigm 
have led to an explosion of research over the past fifteen years.  One such new theory, 
goal systems theory (Kruglanski et al., 2002), predicts that multifinal means will lose 
their advantaged valuation over unifinal mean when the background goal they 
facilitate is deactivated.  Seven studies sought to provide evidence that this will occur 
whether the goal is deactivated due to loss of desirability, loss of attainability, or due 
to attainment of the goal.  Evidence was obtained suggesting that goal attainment 
does in fact deactivate the goal and eliminate the valuation advantage, although 
evidence obtained from testing the the mechanism of goal desirability was not 
supportive of the theory.  The evidence for the role of goal unattainability 
deactivating the goal and eliminating the overvaluation was mixed, suggesting a 
potentially more complex mechanism than had been theorized.  These studies provide 
insight not only on a basic psychological process, but to illustrate potential 
applications in consumer and financial markets as well.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Motivation and the goal construct
     Motivation has long been of great interest in social psychology going back as far 
as Triplett's (1898) social facilitation experiment.  Lewin's (1926) discussion of 
“intentions”, “needs”, and later levels of “aspiration” (Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & 
Sears, 1944) were early inquiries into what we now consider motivational 
phenomena.  Motivation has been prominent in social psychological theorizing since 
at least Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, and more recent studies 
have inquired into how motivation affects our beliefs about ourselves (Kunda, 1987) 
and others (Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Fein & Spencer 1997).  In the past decade, 
research on motivation under the “New Look” paradigm has focused on the cognitive 
properties of motivation and their implications (Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, 
Friedman, Chun, & Sleeth-Keppler, 2002), resulting in the primacy of the goal 
construct in motivational research.  The definition we will use for goals here is that 
they are cognitive representations in memory (Kruglanski, 1996) that are focused at 
some end state which is associated with positive affect (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). 
     The primary characteristic of goals is that they represent a discrepancy between a 
desired state and one's current state.  This “tension” between the current and ideal 
states gives the goal its motivational property (Lewin, 1936).  Carver & Scheier, 
(1998) identify the process of how this happens: people constantly monitor the 
discrepancy between their current state and their desired end state, and use their 
emotions as feedback to determine whether to to continue pursuit (if affect is 
negative) or discontinue pursuit (affect is positive, suggesting the ideal state has been 
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reached).  A common example of this is a very hungry person who feels tense and 
unpleasant until he has had enough to eat, at which point the feeling of pleasant 
satiation terminates the pursuit behavior (eating).  Our attention is automatically 
directed toward goal-related stimuli (Moskowitz, 2002) as any struggling dieter can 
tell you, but goals  differ from motivationally neutral constructs in how our memory 
retains them as well.  Whereas research on neutral stimuli has found that knowledge 
decays in memory over time when unprompted (Atkinson & Birch, 1970), stimuli that 
are related to active goals actually increase in cognitive activation when left 
unaccomplished (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996).  As a result, goal pursuit differs 
from non-motivated activities in that it is resistant to cessation as a result of 
encountering obstacles, and if momentarily disrupted pursuit will likely be resumed 
once the opportunity is available (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & 
Trötschel, 2001).
Goal systems architecture.
     Since goals are cognitive representations of motivational constructs (Kruglanski, 
1996), they behave according to rules of  knowledge activation (Higgins, 1996).  This 
suggests that our many goals are in a constant state of flux, as opposed to the “stable” 
motivations of past models (Hollis, 1994); goals can increase in urgency from one 
moment to the next as a result of spreading activation through related constructs 
(Anderson & Reder, 1999).  Kruglanski et al.'s (2002) goal systems theory proposes a 
“railroad tracks” metaphor explaining the facilitative connections between a goal, its 
multiple means of accomplishment, and higher-level goals to which the goal itself 
serves as a means.  For example, a student may have a goal of getting an important 
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paper written.  This will in turn increase the cognitive activation of different means to 
accomplishing the goal (study materials, desk, and computer) a well as a higher-order 
goal that writing the paper is itself a means to (graduating from college).  Thus, goals 
can be activated even by mention of a relationship partner or significant other in one's 
life (Fitzsimmons & Bargh, 2003).  Consequently, accomplishing a goal will lead to 
decreased activation of its means and related concepts (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). 
Goal systems theory also suggests inhibitory connections between competing goals, 
such as the sudden reminder that one needs to study for an important test inhibiting 
the temptation to spend the evening out with friends (Fishbach & Shah, 2006). 
Motivation is rarely stable from one moment to the next.      
Automatic and unconscious goal-consistent evaluations
     Having a goal active in memory has been found to result in potential means to that 
goal being automatically evaluated in terms of their perceived instrumentality to that 
goal (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004, Study 2).  These authors utilized a sequential-priming 
lexical decision task to find that thirsty participants were faster at responding to 
words that were relevant to the goal of quenching thirst (water, juice) only when these 
words were preceded by a positive (vs. negative) prime.  This was interpreted as 
evidence that the goal of quenching thirst caused the means to attain that goal to be 
evaluated more positively, leading to a faster reaction time.  Subsequent studies have 
confirmed this basic finding in different contexts.  In fact, not only does the activation 
of a goal result in the automatic evaluation of its direct means to accomplishment 
(such as a dieting goal having a positive effect on evaluations for healthy food but 
negative for unhealthy food, see Fishbach, Shah, & Kruglanski, 2004), but also 
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impacts the evaluation of things that are more peripherally instrumental to the goal, 
such as friends and relationship partners (Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008). 
     Importantly, these automatic evaluations (and the reactions stemming from them) 
often occur below the threshold of conscious awareness.  Research done in the late 
1990s on the phenomenon of behavioral mimicry produced ample evidence that 
subliminal visual primes could alter behavior in a manner consistent with the prime 
(Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998; Chartrand 
& Bargh, 1999).  For example, participants in these studies waited longer to interrupt 
a conversation when primed with “politeness”, walked more slowly down the hall 
when primed with words related to the elderly, reacted more angrily to a fake 
computer crash after being shown pictures of African-American males, and were 
better at answering Trivial Pursuit questions when primed with “professor”.  While 
these findings were originally interpreted as an unmotivated “perception-behavior 
link” (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), a series of destructive replications by Cesario, 
Plaks, & Higgins (2006) demonstrated the crucial role that motivation (goals) played 
in these situations.  Participants did not simply walk slower when primed with words 
related to the elderly: those who were pretested as liking the elderly did indeed walk 
slower when primed with these words, but those who were pretested as disliking the 
elderly actually walked faster if they were given the subliminal prime.  Similarly, 
participants reacted more angrily to a fake computer crash when shown subliminal 
pictures of men labeled “gay” than those shown the same pictures labeled “straight”, 
despite the fact that gay men are not stereotyped as aggressive.  Cesario et al. (2006) 
used these new studies to reinterpret the existing mimicry literature to suggest a 
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“motivated preparation to interact”, in which people unconsciously take steps to 
facilitate closer interactions with those who they like (walking slower will 
stereotypically help one interact better with elderly people; being in an analytical 
frame of mind will help one interact better with professors) and maintaining more 
distance from those they dislike (walking faster will help one get away from the 
elderly; angry confrontations with a gay man will make it less likely he will want to 
be around you).  In short, this literature demonstrates the powerful effect active goals 
can have on our evaluations and subsequent behavior even when they operate outside 
our conscious awareness.   
Multifinality and the impact of background goals
     According to goal systems theory (Kruglanski et al., 2002), when multiple goals 
are active, people will try to find a multifinal means that will satisfy all goals (e.g., 
eating out with new colleagues is a means that can satisfy all the goals of alleviating 
hunger, networking, and having fun).  Chun & Kruglanski (2005, Study 3) provide an 
example of multifinality in action.  In this study, participants were given the goal of 
taste-testing 3 ostensibly different colas and deciding on the best one (the same cola 
was used for all three but labeled differently).  Thus, participants had the focal 
(primary) goal of accuracy.  However, the experimenters manipulated a background 
goal (affiliation) in this study as well.  After a pretest revealed that Coke was viewed 
by participants as more “American” than the other two brands of cola (Pepsi and 
Shoppers), the experimenters set up a 2 X 2 design in which the affiliation goal was 
manipulated (participants read an article designed to induce either American-identity 
pride vs. shame) and the instrumentality of the colas to the focal goal of accuracy was 
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manipulated (in the “Shoppers Superior” condition the “Pepsi” and “Coke” were 
diluted and “Shoppers” was normal, whereas in the “Shoppers Inferior” condition all 
three were the same).  The results of this study were that when the Shoppers Cola was 
“Superior” (undiluted) and thus clearly better tasting than the others, participants 
chose that as the best cola regardless of affiliation goal.  However, in the “Inferior” 
condition, when all three choices tasted exactly the same (and thus were equally 
instrumental to the focal goal of being accurate), participants who had read the 
identity-pride article overchose Coke while those who had read the identity-shame 
article did not, suggesting that the influence of the background goal was decisive only 
when it was unclear which was the best option using the focal goal of accuracy.  
The present research
     One aspect of the multifinality principle that has not yet received empirical 
support is the impact of goal deactivation on the valuation of multifinal means.  If one 
of the goals that made a means multifinal in the past is deactivated, this means should 
not be valued over the unifinal means in pursuing the remaining goal, as it was 
previously.  In this respect, goal systems theory (Kruglanski et al., 2002) extends 
earlier motivational models such as Thagard & Millgram's (1995)  “coherence” 
model.  Goal systems theory specifies what will happen when there are changes to the 
goal system, such as new goals being activated and introduced into the system while 
existing goals can be deactivated and taken out, while the “coherence” model omits 
any mention of the consequences of goal deactivation.  This contrast is indicative of 
the theoretical gap between the “New Look” in motivation underlying goal systems 
theory and more traditional rational-choice theories.  In the “New Look” (see 
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Kruglanski et al., 2002), motivation is dynamic and in constant flux, context 
dependent (can be primed), and is interconnected with other units of the system (such 
as a goal and its means) with automatic transfer of properties (activation, 
commitment, affective qualities) from one unit to the next.  On the other hand, 
traditional decision models (such as the widely-applied rational choice theory of 
classical economics) assumes stable preferences that are unaffected by context and 
presentation (Hollis, 1994, p.116). While Thagard & Millgram (1995, p.444) agree 
with Kruglanski et al. that greater desirability of a “supergoal” will cause greater 
activation of units linked to it within the system, Thagard & Millgram are silent on 
the effects of changes of a goal's perceived attainability or attainment on its 
activation within the system.  In both circumstances, goal systems theory predicts the 
goal should be deactivated; it is not “goal-worthy”  if it is not both desirable and 
attainable, and there is no current/desired state discrepancy once it is attained 
(Kruglanski, 1996).  As a result, the deactivated goal should no longer exert influence 
on decision-making, and the multifinal means should lose its valuation advantage.
     While much of the research on motivation has been done in traditional social 
psychology domains such as person perception and self-regulation or business 
domains such as consumer choice, goal systems theory can advance understanding in 
behavioral economics as well when applied to the domain of market and pricing 
distortions.  For that reason, the present research will investigate the phenomenon of 
goal-moderated price devaluation in the context of evaluating financial products and 
consumer products.  Despite a increased interest on the part of traditional finance 
researchers to incorporate psychological principles into their models, the impact of 
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multiple motivations has not found a prominent place in this literature.  In his book 
summarizing the major findings in behavioral finance, Hersh Shefrin (2002) identifies 
three major themes that behavioral finance has been focused on to date: heuristic-
driven biases, frame dependence, and inefficient capital markets.  While the first two 
themes are based on cognitive psychological principles (see Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974), researchers in this field have not drawn significantly from social psychological 
research on motivation despite a large literature suggesting motivation does influence 
perceptions and judgments (Bruner, 1957; Kunda, 1987), particularly under 
conditions where the “accurate” choice is unclear or uncertain (Chun & Kruglanski, 
2005).  Thus, the present research provides the contextual opportunity for advancing 
understanding in financial economics as well as consumer and social psychology.
Overview of Research
     Seven studies were conducted to establish the impact of deactivating background 
goals on the valuation of multifinal means, relative to those who have not had the 
background goal deactivated.  All these studies involved both the focal goal of 
accurately pricing a product at its “fair” market value, and background goals (such as 
affiliation, personal success or personal accomplishment) that could bias the estimates 
of fair market value.  Study 1 examined how fulfillment of an affiliation goal through 
a substitute means affected valuation of a consumer product that is relevant to a 
common affiliation (a University of Maryland sweatshirt) compared to a neutral 
product.  Study 2 examined the predicted cause of this valuation bias, that goals that 
are attained will be deactivated.  Study 2 replicated Study 1's procedure but used a 
reaction time task to measure whether the attained goal showed lower cognitive 
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activation (instead of the price estimation task of Study 1).  Study 3 investigated how 
fulfillment of the goal of being personally successful affects valuation of companies 
that are seen as more (but not less) successful.  Study 4 examined the impact that 
making a goal (the goal of accomplishing something great and innovative with your 
life) seem unattainable had on valuations of companies that are seen as more vs. less 
innovative.  Study 5 examined the predicted cause of this valuation bias, replicating 
Study 4's procedure but using a reaction time task to measure differences in goal 
activation (instead of the price estimation task) as a function of goal attainability. 
Studies 6 and 7 examined the impact of lessening the desirability of a goal on 
valuations of consumer products that are potential means to accomplishing that goal. 
A common thread in these seven studies is that each was designed in such a way as to 
attempt to provide evidence that the goal deactivation manipulation not only 
decreases evaluation of the multifinal mean (the goal-relevant object) relative to those 
who have the goal still active, but will have the opportunity to show that evaluations 
of goal-neutral (non-multifinal) objects do not differ as a function of the goal prime 
(condition).  This procedural aspect will rule out differences due to cognitive or 
affective factors, leaving motivation as the sole possible explanation.  
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Chapter 2: Devaluation Due to Goal Attainment (Studies 1-3)
Study 1: The Effect of Goal Attainment on Consumer Product Valuations 
     Study 1 investigated how fulfillment of a background goal (vs. unfulfillment) 
caused multifinal means to lose their price valuation advantage over unifinal means 
(those to which the only relevant goal is to be accurate), using a scenario similar to 
those encountered by shoppers at online retailers such as Amazon.com.
Methods
     Participants.  112 undergraduate psychology students at the University of 
Maryland took part in this research in exchange for partial course credit. 
Recruitment, appointments, and credit were handled by the university's online 
research participation system.
     Design.  This study utilized a 2(substitute means attainment/no substitute means 
attainment) X 2(goal-relevant product/goal-irrelevant product) within-subjects design.
     Procedure.  Participants were recruited for an ostensibly 2-part “Consumer 
Marketing Study”.  After they had arrived at the lab, been greeted by the 
experimenter and given informed consent, participants sat down in a cubicle to 
complete the experiment on a computer using MediaLab software.  Their task was 
described as first take part in an experiment investigating the relationship between 
personality types and goal pursuit, and then taking part in a second experiment 
investigating their valuation of consumer products over the internet vs. in person. 
After completing a number of personality measures that were irrelevant to the design 
of the study (and were introduced merely for the purpose of supporting the cover 
story), all participants completed an “impressions” task in which they quickly rated 
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an unfamiliar character of text as more “positive” or “negative”.  Responses to this 
task were not relevant to the research hypothesis; instead, the task served as a vehicle 
to subliminally prime all participants with the word “TERPS”, which is the short 
nickname for the university's mascot, the Maryland Terrapins.  This was done so that 
students would have this group affiliation accessible for use later in the study.  The 
prime was presented for 20ms and was masked both before and after by an alternating 
series of XXXXX, HHHHH, and  EEEEE.  It can  be safely assumed that the prime 
was unconscious since no one was able to identify the word in pretesting even when 
forewarned that a word was being primed, and no participants voiced suspicion about 
this task at the end of the experiment.   
     Following the impressions task, all participants were informed of research 
suggesting numerous psychological benefits for those who affiliate themselves with at 
least one community as opposed to those who are complete individualists.  As a 
manipulation check, participants were asked questions of whether they agreed with 
this research and whether they thought it applied to them.  Following this, half of the 
participants were asked to write a short paragraph about a group they affiliate with 
and why that group is important to them (substitute attainment condition), while the 
other half wrote a short paragraph about their favorite food and why they like it (no 
substitute attainment).  After writing this paragraph, all participants started the 
“second study” in which they were be shown pictures of consumer products from a 
large online retailer.  They were then given the explicit (focal) goal to evaluate 15 
items of athletic apparel in randomized order (shirts, running pants, shoes, socks, 
sweatshirts), saying what they think the retail price is for each item.  Notably, 
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participants were asked right after this what they personally would pay for this item; 
this was intended as a subtle way to remind them for subsequent trials that they are 
focusing on what the objective retail price should be for the item in the first question. 
Two of these 15 items were the dependent variables for this study: a University of 
Maryland sweatshirt (which is a means to the University of Maryland students' 
affiliation goal) and a plain gray sweatshirt (which is affiliation-goal neutral).  When 
all 15 items had been responded to, participants were fully debriefed and thanked for 
their participation.
     It was predicted that the Maryland sweatshirt would be valued more highly by 
those with the goal unattained (no substitute fulfillment) than those who had 
experienced attainment through a substitute means, while the plain sweatshirt would 
be valued the same regardless of goal attainment or unattainment.  This finding would 
rule out the possibility of a main effect due to cognitive factors or from the positive 
affect enjoyed from goal fulfillment, and would give evidence of an active goal 
influencing perceptions of what a consumer good should be priced at in a large 
market (as opposed to a mere personal preference).
Results
     Treatment check of goal activation prime.  Participants' responses to two questions 
were evaluated: whether they believed the research statement that affiliating with 
some group provided psychological benefits generally and whether they believed it 
was true for them personally.  All participants did respond on the affirmative side of 
the scale for both questions (5-7 on a 7-point scale), providing evidence that the goal 
was indeed active for all participants prior to the experimental manipulation.
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     Analysis of participants' conscious responses to an important group.  It was 
theoretically important to provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
participants' unconscious goals could influence their valuation of goal-relevant 
objects.  Thus, any participant in the substitute-attainment condition who wrote about 
the University of Maryland as their important group were removed from the final 
analysis (5 in total).  Post-hoc analyses revealed that the removal of these participants 
did alter results enough to change the findings of the experiment, and will be reported 
along with the normal results.  
     Primary analysis: valuation of multifinal vs. unifinal means under goal activation 
vs. deactivation.   104 participants were included in this final analysis.  Two 
datapoints were analyzed per participant: what they though the fair market price of 
the University of Maryland sweatshirt (goal-relevant product) and the plain gray 
sweatshirt (goal-irrelevant product) should be.  Results were analyzed first as a 2 
(condition: substitute fulfillment vs. no substitute fulfillment) X 2 (goal-relevant vs. 
goal-irrelevant product) factorial ANOVA.  A significant interaction was found, F(1, 
102) = 4.96, p < .028, indicating that valuation patterns of the objects differed as a 
function of goal fulfillment condition.  Valuations of the goal-irrelevant object (the 
plain gray sweatshirt) did not differ as a function of prior goal attainment: those in the 
substitute means attainment condition estimated the cost to be $20.56, while those 
unable to attain their goal through a substitute means similarly valued it at $20.67. 
Valuations of the goal-relevant object (University of Maryland sweatshirt) did 
however vary as a function of prior goal attainment: $35.26 for those in the goal-
attainment condition, but $40.37 for those who had not attained their goal through a 
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substitute means (see Figure 1), F (1, 102) = 4.67, p < .033.  This evidence is 
consistent with the hypothesis and the underlying theory that motivated evaluative 
biases will only be influential when the background goal causing the bias is currently 
active, having not been already attained.
     Inclusion of the 5 participants (109 total) who reported the University of Maryland 
as their important group did not nominally alter group means drastically, although the 
test of significance for the interaction term did become insignificant (p > .13).  None 
of these participants reported suspicion at seeing an object related to the subject they 
had just written about when given an opportunity to do so during the debriefing, 
although to do so would have required additional effort at a time when they had been 
told they were “almost done”. 
     Follow-up analysis using the BIC.  A follow-up analysis (of the 104 participants) 
was conducted using a Bayesian method designed to provide evidence diagnostic of 
whether the null hypothesis or experimental hypothesis is preferable given the data 
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(as opposed to being diagnostic of how likely the data were to have occurrred 
assuming the validity of the null hypothesis; see Wagenmakers, 2007 for a 
discussion).  The results of this test were that there was improvement from the main 
effects model to the interaction model, ΔBIC = -.293, indicating that the interaction is 
preferred to the null model (albeit very weakly).  This analysis too was supportive of 
the experimental hypothesis.
Discussion
     Study 1 was designed to test the hypothesis that deactivation a goal through 
attainment will cause goal-relevant (but not goal-irrelevant) objects to lose their 
evaluation advantage relative to a state of goal unattainment.  The data obtained 
showed the pattern predicted by the theory and the validity of those mean differences 
was supported using both the conventional null hypothesis sampling distribution 
significance test and the Bayesian method.  The hypothesis was supported.
Study 2: Conceptual Replication of Study 1 using a Reaction Time Measure
     Study 2 sought to verify that the experimental manipulation used in Study 1 did 
actually deactivate the goal in question, using a reaction times measure.  Study 2 
sought to provide evidence that goal attainment will lead to deactivation of goal-
related constructs (which was how the valuation advantage was theorized to be lost in 
Study 1).  This experiment replicated the methodology of Study 1 up until the point 
where participants were to view the consumer products whose retail price they were 
supposed to estimate.  However, instead of the price estimation task, participants took 
part in a lexical decision task designed to assess the activation of the goal using words 
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that are related to it compared to words that are goal-unrelated (Higgins, 1996; 
Kruglanski, 1996).
Method
     Participants.  111 psychology undergraduates at the University of Maryland 
participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course credit.  Recruitment, 
appointments, and credit were handled by the university's online research 
participation system.
     Design.  This study utilized a 2(substitute means attainment/no substitute means 
attainment) X 2(goal-relevant words/goal-irrelevant words) within-subjects design.
     Procedure.  As in Study 1, participants were recruited for an ostensibly 2-part 
study, this time entitled “Reflexes and Reactions”.  After using MediaLab software to 
complete two personality scales in order to support the multiple-studies cover story, 
participants were subliminally primed using DirectRT software with the word 
“TERPS” while completing a reaction time task that was ostensibly measuring their 
positive and negative impressions of novel text characters.  Following this, all were 
given the same affiliation goal-activation prime as occurred in Study 1, citing 
research about the health and happiness benefits of affiliating with an important group 
or community, including the same treatment checks that had been used prior.  Next, 
participants in the goal-attained condition were asked to write a short paragraph about 
a group that was important to them and why it was important while those assigned to 
the goal-unattained condition wrote about their favorite food and why they liked it.
     After this point, the methodology of the present study diverged from that of Study 
1.  Participants were informed that the next study they would be taking part in today 
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was a reaction task, in which their goal would be identify character strings that 
appeared on the screen as either words or nonwords by pressing the “Z” key if it was 
a word and the “/” key if it was a nonword.  Specifically, they were told that their task 
was to respond as quickly and accurately as they possibly could, seeing as this task 
was a measure of their reflexive ability.  After repeating the instructions and going 
through five practice trials, the actual experimental task began.
     The lexical decision task actually contained three classes of word stimuli: 25 
nonwords (FTERC, YADENS, TOGGIX), 15 words that were unrelated to the 
affiliation goal (SHOESTRING, PET, YESTERDAY) and 10 words that were related 
to the goal (MARYLAND, TERPS, BASKETBALL, TEAM, RED, SCHOOL, 
SPIRIT).  After all 50 words were presented in a completely randomized manner and 
responded to, participants were debriefed, thanked for their participation, and 
assigned credit for the study.  The hypothesis was that due to the increased cognitive 
accessibility of goal-related constructs (see Higgins, 1996a; Kruglanski, 1996 for a 
discussion), those in the goal unattained condition would be able to react faster in 
correctly identifying goal-related words than those in the goal attained conditioned, 
whereas no differences were predicted across condition on the goal-irrelevant words.
Results
     Treatment checks.  Responses to the question of whether individuals believed that 
seeing yourself as group or community was personally important were analyzed. 
Only one individual indicated moderate/strong disagreement with this question (5 or 
6 on a 1-6 scale); this participant was excluded from the final analyses and will not be 
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discussed further since exclusion did not change the statistical conclusions of the 
study.
     Analysis of participants' conscious responses to an important group.  In Study 1, it 
was theoretically important to provide evidence that participants' unconscious goals 
could influence their valuation of goal-relevant objects.  Thus, any participant in the 
substitute-attainment condition who wrote about the University of Maryland as their 
important group were removed from the final analysis.  In Study 5 this was not an 
important concern since no goal-related object was being evaluated, but for the sake 
of consistency with the earlier study, subsequent analyses were run both with and 
without the 5 participants who mentioned the University of Maryland as their 
important group.    
     Incomplete data/coding errors.  3 participants had data that were incomplete (they 
had MediaLab entries but not DirectRT entries or vice-versa) or duplicated in one 
program but not the other, so they could not be included in the final analysis.  This 
left 103 participants available for the final analysis.  
     Primary analysis.  The scores of the 10 goal-related words and the 15 goal-
unrelated words were averaged together to form indices.  Prior to being averaged 
together, all individual responses that were incorrectly responded to (indicating a 
word was in fact a nonword) were deleted.  Participants who had an overall error rate 
above 20% were removed from the analysis entirely (3 participants in total); one 
additional participant was removed because a bimodal response pattern was detected 
within all three categories of stimuli (early trials averaged 650ms, while later trials 
averaged 1500ms).  To reduce the dataset's expected skew, individual RT scores for 
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both innovative and non-innovative words were (natural) log-transformed, and any 
individual datapoint that exceeded three standard deviations from the individual's 
mean was eliminated;  the final mean score indices were then constructed and 
incorporated with the rest of the survey data in MediaLab.  These indices were then 
examined in a 2(condition: goal attained vs. unattained) X 2(word: goal related vs 
unrelated) repeated measures factorial ANOVA.  The resulting interaction was 
significant, F(1, 94) = 5.069, p < .027 (ΔBIC = -.33, suggesting the interaction model 
was weakly preferable to the main effects only model).  The resulting examination of 
the (log-transformed) means found the pattern predicted: those in the goal-unattained 
condition identified goal-relevant words (528ms, ln = 6.270) faster than the goal-
irrelevant baseline words (553ms, ln = 6.316) by a greater margin than those in the 
goal-attained condition did (530 vs 541ms, lns = 6.274 and 6.294 respectively; see 
Figure 2).  To confirm that these results were not due merely to the method of 
analysis, a identical analysis was run using the median scores for each individual 
instead of the log-transformed means; the results were the same, F(1, 94) = 4.792, p < 
.031 (ΔBIC = -.32).  This evidence supported the experimental hypothesis and 
conceptually replicated the finding of Study 1.
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      An analysis was also run incorporating the 5 participants who specifically 
mentioned Maryland as their important group and were thus omitted earlier. 
Including these participants did not substantially alter the scale means, however, their 
presence did reduce the interaction F ratio test to statistical insignificance (p > .15). 
This also matches the finding of Study 1, that if participants who had mentioned 
Maryland as their important group were included in the final analysis, the previously 
significant test result became insignificant.   
Discussion
     The hypothesis that deactivating the affiliation goal would lead to decreased 
cognitive accessibility of goal-related (but not goal-unrelated) constructs as measured 
by reaction times was supported, and Study 2 conceptually replicated Study 1 using 
much of the same procedure.  This successful replication strongly supports the 






























goal-relevant items to be overvalued after it is attained because the goal has been 
deactivated and is thus less cognitively accessible in memory.
Study 3: Replication of Study 1 using financial products
     Studies 1 and 2 provided evidence of a substitute means fulfilling a background 
goal of affiliation, leading to a decrease in the premium participants estimated on a 
goal-relevant (but not goal-irrelevant) consumer product.  Study 3 was designed to 
replicate this finding, using financial products (stocks of different companies) instead 
of clothing products and a personal success goal instead of a group affiliation goal.
Method
     Participants.  80 students enrolled in a psychology research methods course took 
this survey during a class session in exchange for partial course credit.
     Design.  This study used a 2(substitute fulfillment/no substitute fulfillment) X 3 
(goal-consistent stock/goal-inconsistent stock) within-subjects design.  
     Procedure.  Participants completed a survey packet described as containing 
multiple studies conducted by 3 graduate students in the psychology and marketing 
departments.  Participants first completed a pair of personality scales that were 
unrelated to the hypothesis of this experiment but included to support the “separate 
studies” cover story.  Immediately after the personality scales, the goal of being 
personally successful was induced as participants read the following statement:
“Research over the past 30 years has suggested that feeling successful 
at one's pursuits is an important factor in how happy someone is. 
Those who consider themselves successful report having higher 
satisfaction, lower stress, and greater anticipated enjoyment of future 
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pursuits.  However, it is not clear what all the specific aspects of 
situations and individual personalities are that make one person feel 
successful where another does not.”
Participants were then asked to indicate on a Likert scale how strongly they believed 
that feeling successful was important for psychological health, and how important it 
was for them personally to be successful also.
     Next, participants were given the experimental manipulation.  Those in the goal 
attained condition were asked to write about a time when they were very successful at 
something, while those in the goal unattained condition were asked to write about a 
time when they had been unsuccessful:
“Now, please write a short paragraph on a time when you were very 
successful/very unsuccessful at something (such as a school, work, or 
social setting).  Describe what happened and why it was important to 
you.  Please emphasize how you felt about yourself and toward others 
in that situation.”
Participants then turned the page and were told that they would now be entering the 
final section of the survey (to support the separate-studies cover story).  They were 
told that the purpose of this research was to understand how lay-people valued 
corporate stocks, and that they would be given three pieces of information: what the 
company's industry sector was, its price one year ago and its price today, and its 
expected prospects for growth in the future.  Participants were told that all the 
companies (whose stock prices they were about to see) were too small for most 
people to have heard of them, but in order to prevent the names from biasing their 
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judgments, the companies would merely be identified as A, B, C, etc.  Furthermore, 
participants were told that the five industry sectors all the companies could be 
classified into (regional grocers, cellular software, medical equipment, 
telecommunications, and insurance) were recession-resistant, so the country's current 
economic environment would not greatly affect them.
     Next, participants were given information on all 15 companies, labeled A-O.  Each 
company was identified first with a market sector, its expected growth prospects were 
explained, and then its stock price both one year ago and today was given.  Following 
this, participants were asked, “By what percentage do you think the stock price will 
increase/decrease one year from now?  (circle)”, and were given a Likert-type scale of 
percentage increases or decreases ranging between positive and negative 25% at 
intervals of 5%.  Following this, participants were asked to provide a explain in a 
sentence or two why they made the prediction that they did.  Once predictions had 
been made for all 15 companies, participants were asked a question to gauge their 
suspicion about the true nature of the experiment and were given a verbal debriefing.  
     The independent variable of interest was the company's expectations for growth, 
since this is how successful the company is expected to be in the future (all the 
companies had been said previously to be small, so past success could be inferred to 
be equal).  Three possible answers were given for the growth prospects of each 
company: growth was expected to be positive (“The company is expected to grow 
substantially in the near future.”), growth was expected to be neutral (“The company 
is not expected to grow further, but is not expected to contract either.  Profits are 
expected to be stable.”), or growth was expected to be negative (“The company is 
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expected to contract in the near future.”).  Companies expected to have high growth 
were success-goal consistent, while companies expected to have zero or negative 
growth were success-goal inconsistent.  The price of the company's stock (both the 
year ago and today values) was given as a dollar amount; each company had an 
objective increase or decrease of between -20 and +20% over the last year (for 
example, a year-ago price of $35.52 and price today of $39.06).  While each company 
had a different sized increase or decrease individually, each growth category 
(positive, neutral, and negative) had five different companies (one from each of the 5 
market sectors) whose total objective increase/decrease averaged 7%, assuring that 
neither objective price change over the past year nor industry sector was confounded 
with the independent variable of growth expectations.
      It was predicted that those in the no substitute fulfillment condition (wrote about a 
time when they were personally unsuccessful in pursuing a goal) would value the 
growing companies much higher than non-growing companies, while those in the 
substitute fulfillment condition would value those growing only slightly higher (or no 
differently) than the companies that are not growing.
Results
      Suspicion check.  No participants were removed due to answers on the suspicion 
check.  Three participants gave answers that were somewhat similar to the hypothesis 
of this study (for example, “I think someone's personality or putting them in a bad 
mood could make them less optimistic about stock performance”) but retention vs. 
removal of these participants did not change the statistical conclusions of the study.
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     Analysis of explicit reasons given for stock's expected performance.  Participants 
cited the price change and growth expectations listed for the company as the reasons 
for their predictions.  No one mentioned the past event of being successful or not that 
they had written about earlier in the survey packet, so there was no evidence 
suggesting this made a conscious impact on their decisions.
     Primary analysis: valuation of goal consistent/inconsistent stocks under differing  
goal fulfillment. All 80 participants were included in this final analysis.  Scores for 
the 15 companies evaluated were averaged together to construct three indices: one for 
those with positive growth expectations, one for neutral expectations, and one for 
those with negative growth expectations.   Results were analyzed as a 2(success goal: 
fulfilled/not) X 3(company growth expectation: positive/neutral/negative) repeated-
measures factorial ANOVA.  The resulting test was not significant, F(2, 156) = 2.11, 
p < .125, evidence that the experimental hypothesis was not confirmed.  The Bayesian 
analysis of the same hypothesis revealed that the main effects only model was 
decidedly preferable to the interaction model, ΔBIC = 2.25.  Furthermore, an 
examination of the index means by condition revealed a pattern that was not even 
trending in the direction anticipated.  The group of stocks expected to grow the most 
were nominally valued higher by those in the goal attained condition (10.75%) than 
those in the goal unattained condition (9.37%), while the stocks expected to be 
unchanged were nearly identical between conditions (1.47% vs. 1.54%) and stocks 
with negative growth expected were nominally valued less by those in the goal 
attained condition (-4.10%, vs. -2.31% for those in the goal unattained condition).
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     Further exploration of the repeated-measures ANOVA model revealed a potential 
insight into why the results were not as predicted: the main effect of the repeated 
measure in the model (expectations of positive, neutral, or negative growth 
expectations) accounted for 65.45% of the sums of squares (variability) in the study, 
compared to less than 1% that could be attributed to the interaction.  It is thus entirely 
possible that the main effect was so strong as to wipe out the possibility of the effect 
hypothesized for the study to manifest.  
Discussion
          Study 3 was designed to test the hypothesis that deactivation a goal through 
attainment will cause goal-relevant (but not goal-irrelevant) objects to lose their 
evaluation advantage relative to a state of goal unattainment.  The data obtained did 
not confirm the experimental hypothesis, or even show the pattern predicted by the 
theory.  Furthermore, the Bayesian statistical technique suggested that it was 
decidedly preferable to adopt the null hypothesis (main effects only) as opposed to 
the interaction model.  The hypothesis was not supported.  This may have happened 
because the experimental manipulation had too weak of an effect; since no 
manipulation check was used (as it likely would have caused suspicion as to the true 
nature of the experiment), there is no further analysis that can be done to investigate 
this possibility. However, another explanation for why the experiment did not work as 
hypothesized can be inferred from the extraordinarily large (nearly 66%) amount of 
variability attributable to the main effect of stimulus type in this study relative to the 
insignificant interaction effect of interest (less than 1%).  Just as Chun & Kruglanski 
(2005) found no difference in taste when an unambiguous and relevant criteria for 
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differentiating cola taste was available, it is possible that the clarity of growth 
expectations for the companies left no room for motivated biases to show up in 
companies' future price projections.     
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Chapter 3: Devaluation Due to Goal Unattainability
Study 4
     Study 4 had three purposes.  First, it was run to provide evidence that deactivating 
a goal by making it appear unattainable (and thus not goal-worthy) will have an 
effect on stock valuations similar to the one predicted in Study 2: that deactivating the 
goal, now due to attainment through substitute means, would lead to a decrease in the 
valuation of goal-consistent companies' stocks but not .  Second, it will address a 
potential alternative explanation left open in the earlier studies.  Research consistent 
with self-affirmation theory (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000) suggests that 
motivated evaluative biases can be reduced by giving people the chance to affirm a 
belief or value that is important to their self-concept.  For example, recalling a time 
when one acted in accordance with a self-generated important value can result in 
greater persuasion on a counterattitudinal topic such as capital punishment (Cohen et 
al., 2000, Studies 1 and 2).  In Study 1 of the present research, the manipulation 
(writing about an important group/goal attainment vs. favorite food/goal 
nonattainment) and expected results (higher valuation of the goal-relevant Maryland 
sweatshirt when the goal has not been attained) can be reinterpreted in line with self-
affirmation theory.  Study 4, in contrast, predicts that the “biased” positive evaluation 
of goal-consistent objects will subside when a goal is appraised as less/not attainable; 
in other words, this procedure involves “unaffirming” a potentially self-important 
goal, with the expected result of reducing a motivational bias.  This is decidedly 
different from what self-affirmation theory would predict.  Third and finally, this 
study provides a potential explanation using experimental evidence for a distortion in 
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real-world financial markets: that companies or industry sectors in growth areas that 
are seen as “innovative” could be chronically overvalued (and thus poorer 
investments) than less innovative (“value”) companies or sectors.  This possibility 
will be explored more fully in the implications section following the proposed 
studies.   
     This study borrows conceptually from Lockwood and Kunda's (1997, Study 2) 
research on social comparison processes.  In their study, first-year accounting 
students rated themselves more positively after reading about a “superstar” fourth-
year accounting student than a control group of their peers, while fourth-year 
accounting students rated themselves less positively as a result of reading about the 
same target.  The reasoning for this result was that the outstanding accomplishments 
described were still attainable to first-year-students, that this inspired them to want to 
work harder and thus increased how positively they saw themselves.  Conversely, the 
outstanding accomplishments described were not perceived to be attainable to fourth-
year students because they did not have the time or opportunity required to 
accomplish them.  While post-hoc analyses revealed that fourth-year students were 
much more likely to denigrate the comparison process than first-years, another way of 
reducing the discomfort caused from the negative upward comparison would be to 
deactivate the goal of being a great accounting student (“maybe good/average is good 
enough after all”).  Study 3 sought to demonstrate a similar effect by manipulating the 
attainability of our participants' life accomplishment goal, but using valuation of 
investments instead of self-evaluation as the dependent variable of interest.
Method
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     Participants.  102 psychology undergraduates at the University of Maryland took 
part in this study for partial course credit.  Recruitment, appointments, and credit 
were handled by the university's online research participation system.      
     Design.  This study utilized a 3(goal: attainable/unattainable/not primed) X 2(goal-
relevant product/goal-irrelevant product) repeated-measures design.  
     Procedure.  Participants were recruited for a study on “Choices”.  After they had 
arrived at the lab, been greeted by the experimenter and given informed consent, 
participants sat down in a cubicle to complete the experiment on a computer using 
MediaLab software.  Their task was described as to first take part in an experiment on 
personality and life goals, and second to take part in a qualitative pilot study 
investigating lay-people's reasoning for investments and predictions. 
     After being given a battery of personality questionnaires, participants in the goal 
attainable and goal unattainable conditions (but not the no goal primed condition) 
read the following short article in order to activate the goal of innovativeness:
All throughout our lives, we are constantly reminded of stories about 
people who have achieved great things and changed the world for the 
better.  We hear about people active in the political arena like 
Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King, Jr., who helped to promote 
racial equality and national unity. 
Other societal heroes have made scientific innovations, like Albert 
Einstein's theory of relativity that revolutionized physics and 
astronomy or Jonas Salk inventing a vaccine for polio.  Inventors like 
Thomas Edison have made the world a better place by making new 
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things that improve people's lives in small ways.  Entertainers like 
Walt Disney have brought smiles to millions of faces around the 
world, and elite athletes like Michael Jordan inspire us with their 
tireless work ethic and dazzling skills. 
Famous military leaders like General Washington and General 
Eisenhower have inspired us to struggle for just causes and protecting 
innocent people.  Great philanthropists like Bill Gates devote their 
time and money supporting worthy causes that help solve the world's 
problems.  These are the people that we hear stories about, those who 
society calls “great” and honors long after they pass on. 
The article was split into three short sections in order to increase the likelihood that 
participants would read it more closely.  As a treatment check, participants were 
asked to rate how important it was for them personally to accomplish something great 
in their lives. 
     Following this goal prime, the experimental manipulation was given.  Those in the 
goal attainable condition read about how these great societal pioneers were often 
unsuccessful at an early age:  
This next question pertains to how far along you are on the path to 
accomplishing something great, considering where you are in life. 
Since you are a college student, it may seem like you haven't really 
had much of a chance to get your name in the history books at this 
point.  In fact, many great people were not very distinguished at a 
young age. 
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Participants in the goal attainable condition then read some examples of failures these 
great men had as teens and young adults, such as Einstein being an unspectacular 
student in formal settings, Jordan being cut from the high school basketball team his 
freshman year, Gates dropping out of college at age 21, and Lincoln losing numerous 
elections early in his political life.
     Those in the goal unattainable condition, however, read about how these same 
people were very successful even at an early age: 
This next question pertains to how far along you are on the path to 
accomplishing something great, considering where you are in life. 
Since you are a college student, it may seem like you haven't really 
had much of a chance to get your name in the history books at this 
point.  But in fact, many great people were very distinguished even at 
a young age. 
They then read about Einstein first proposing general relativity at age 24, Jordan 
winning all-ACC honors his freshman year in college, Gates starting his successful 
business at age 21, and Lincoln teaching himself law and passing the Illinois bar as a 
young man.  Participants in both conditions were then given the manipulation checks: 
they rated how attainable they believed their goal of accomplishing something great 
to be, and how much progress they have made toward it compared to these historical 
figures, again taking into consideration that the participant is only still a college 
student.
     Next, participants in all 3 conditions (the no goal prime condition was included 
once again) started what they were told was the second study examining how people 
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project trends and what their reasoning is for those decisions.  After familiarizing the 
participants with what a mutual fund and an economic sector is, participants were told 
that their job in this experiment is to predict the average yearly gain/loss of a sector 
mutual fund over the next 5 years, given a description of that sector and a chart of that 
fund's price over the last year (the 5 year period average was selected in an attempt to 
decrease random variability in the data).  Participants were further told that these 
funds and charts are not taken from the economy recently, so current economic events 
are not relevant.  Most importantly (they were told), the experimenter is interested in 
their reasoning for the prediction they have made and thus they will write a sentence 
describing their rationale for the decision.
     Participants were then shown in succession 14 charts of different sector funds with 
a description of the sector included below (see Figure 3 for an example).  These 
sectors were selected based on a pretest of over 35 sectors; 7 were those that were 
rated in the pretest as the most “innovative” and “positive” (information technology, 
internet companies, biotechnology, entertainment, pharmaceuticals, computers, and 
consumer electronics), while the other 7 were those that pretested as the least 
innovative and positive (banks, retailers, homebuilders, groceries, healthcare, 
insurance, and waste management).  Similar to Study 3, the innovative sectors were 
goal-consistent (related to the goal of accomplishing something great in your life), 
whereas the non-innovative sectors are goal-inconsistent.  The objective chart 
increase/decrease for each innovative sector fund was matched by a nearly identical 
chart for a non-innovative sector fund (for example, if an innovative sector like 
biotechnology charted a 12% increase over the past year, a non-innovative sector like 
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insurance also showed a 12% increase on their chart, and so on).  For each chart, 
participants were asked what they thought the average increase/decrease would be for 
this fund over the next 5 years, and then asked to write a sentence explaining their 
reasoning.  After completing all 14 sector funds, participants were fully debriefed and 
thanked for their participation.
     It was predicted that those in the goal attainable condition would value the 
innovative sectors more highly than the non-innovative sectors, while those in the 
goal unattainable and no goal primed conditions would not show a difference between 
the two.
Results
     Preliminary analyses.  In preparing the data for analysis, participants' one-
sentence responses in explaining their reasoning for their predictions were examined. 
Four participants were excluded from the final analysis: two who either cited current 
events as their reasons, which the instructions prominently prohibited (“the banking 




























































who clearly and repeatedly stated not understanding the instructions given were 
excluded from the final analysis.  This left 98 participants.
     Manipulation checks.  Three manipulation checks were administered to the goal-
attained and goal-unattained (but not no goal prime) groups.  Participants were asked 
after the goal prime but before the attainability prime how important the goal of 
accomplishing something great with your life was, and no mean differences were 
found between the groups (as expected due to random assignment).  Attainability and 
progress were both measured after the attainability prime; there were no significant 
differences between the groups in their ratings of how attainable their goal was (F (1, 
57) = .006, p < .937), although those in the goal-attainable group reported 
significantly more perceived progress toward their goal compared to the goal-
unattainable group (F (1, 57) = 5.80, p < .019).  Thus, there is some evidence that our 
goal attainability manipulation was effective, although not exactly in the way that was 
predicted. 
     Primary analyses.  The seven innovative sectors and the seven non-innovative 
sectors were averaged together to create two separate indices.  These two indices 
were examined using a 3(condition: goal attained/unattained/not primed) X 2(sector: 
goal consistent/inconsistent) factorial ANOVA for the 98 participants that were 
retained in this analysis.  A significant interaction was found, F(2, 95) = 4.42, p < .
015, suggesting that the pattern of means did in fact differ as a function of condition. 
A review of the means suggested that they did fit the pattern that was predicted: non-
innovative sectors did not differ significantly as a function of condition, while 
innovative sectors did.  Those in the goal attainable condition predicted a 4.75% 
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increase for the non-innovative sectors, compared to 4.76% for goal-unattainable and 
4.98% in goal not primed conditions.  For the innovative sectors however, those in 
the goal attainable condition predicted an 8.21% increase compared to a 6.68% 
increase for those in the goal attained and 6.35% in the goal not primed conditions 
(see Figure 4).  While the means for the goal attained condition and goal not primed 
conditions were very similar for both sectors, a 2 X 2 ANOVA revealed that there 
was a significant interaction of condition*sector type for the goal attained and goal 
unattained conditions, F(1, 61) = 4.52, p < .038.  The pattern of the means suggest 
that this could only be due to greater valuation of the innovative sectors by those in 
the goal unattained condition, since valuations of non-innovative sectors were almost 
exactly the same for the two conditions.  Analysis of the mean differences were 
confirmed by the Bayesian statistical method as well: the 3 X 2 interaction model was 
strongly favored over the main effects-only model (ΔBIC = -4.12) while the 2 X 2 
interaction model was preferred over its main effects only alternative, albeit only 
weakly (ΔBIC = -.367).  This evidence is supportive of the experimental hypothesis.
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     The results of this experiment were supportive of the theory that it came to test. 
The 3 X 2 and 2 X 2 interactions of the type of sector rated and goal attainability 
condition were significant and in the predicted direction.  Those who had the goal still 
active (attainable condition) valued the goal-consistent sectors more highly than those 
in the goal deactivated (unattainable condition) but no differences were found for 
goal-inconsistent sectors .  Furthermore, the data from those in the goal attained 
condition was essentially equivalent to the results of those in the condition where the 
goal was never primed, offering confirmatory evidence consistent with the goal not 
being highly active in either condition.
     The single concern of this study was with the lack of differences between groups 
on the attainability manipulation check.  Perceptions of attainability were 
hypothesized to be the mechanism through which the innovativeness goal was 
predicted to be deactivated, so a link is missing in the story this experiment was 
supposed to tell.  However, there are at least two reasonable explanation for why no 
differences were found on this item.  One is that it could be seen as universally 
socially undesirable to say that an important life goal is unattainable, because one 
could be viewed as a quitter; thus no differences on attainability were found between 
conditions, but the progress manipulation check (which should be less sensitive to 
social desirability concerns) did show differences.  A second explanationis that the 
single item measure of attainability could have been insufficiently sensitive to detect 
small differences between the groups.  The concern about this manipulation check 
aside, the experiment offered evidence consistent with the theory.
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Study 5: Conceptual Replication of Study 4 Using Reaction Time Measure
     Study 5 sought to verify that the experimental manipulation used in Study 4 did 
actually deactivate the goal in question, using a reaction times measure.  Study 5 
sought to provide evidence that making a goal appear unattainable will lead to 
deactivation of goal-related constructs (which was how the valuation advantage was 
theorized to be lost in Study 4).  This experiment replicated the methodology of Study 
4 up until the point where participants were to view the sector mutual funds whose 
future performance they were supposed to predict.  Instead of the future price 
estimation task, participants took part in a lexical decision task designed to assess the 
activation of the goal using words that are related to it compared to words that are 
goal-unrelated (Higgins, 1996; Kruglanski, 1996).
Method
     Participants.  97 psychology undergraduates at the University of Maryland 
participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course credit.  Recruitment, 
appointments, and credit were handled by the university's online research 
participation system.
     Design.  This study utilized a 2(goal unattainable/goal attainable) X 2(goal-
relevant words/goal-irrelevant words) within-subjects design.
     Procedure.  As in Study 3, participants were recruited for an ostensibly 2-part 
study, this time entitled “Reflexes and Reactions”.  After using MediaLab software to 
complete two personality scales in order to support the multiple-studies cover story, 
participants read the same short essay given in Study 3 about great people who have 
done important work that changed the world for the better (such as MLK Jr., Einstein, 
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Jonas Salk, etc.).  Following this, they completed the same  treatment check as had 
been used previously: whether accomplishing something great with their life was 
personally important to them.  Next, those in the goal-unattainable condition read the 
essay about how many of these historical figures were very successful even at an 
early age, while those in the goal-attainable condition read about how many of these 
figures were not very distinguished at an age comparable to that of most college 
students.  Participants were then asked how attainable they believed their goal of 
accomplishing something great in life was and how much progress they had made 
toward it (1-6 Likert scale).
     After this point, the methodology of the present study diverged from that of Study 
4 and closely followed the reaction time procedure of Study 2 with some minor 
modifications.  Participants were informed that the next study they would be taking 
part in today was a reaction task, in which their goal would be identify character 
strings that appeared on the screen as either words or nonwords by pressing the “Z” 
key if it was a word and the “/” key if it was a nonword.  Specifically, they were told 
that their task was to respond as quickly and accurately as they possibly could, seeing 
as this task was a measure of their reflexive ability.  After repeating the instructions 
and going through five practice trials, the actual experimental task began.
     The lexical decision task actually contained three classes of word stimuli: 25 
nonwords (FTERC, YADENS, TOGGIX), 15 words that were unrelated to the 
affiliation goal (SHOESTRING, PET, YESTERDAY) and 10 words that were related 
to the goal (INNOVATE, LEADER, GREAT, NEW, PIONEER, BRILLIANT). 
After all 50 words were presented in a completely randomized manner and responded 
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to, participants were debriefed, thanked for their participation, and assigned credit for 
the study.  The hypothesis was that due to the increased cognitive accessibility of 
goal-related constructs (see Higgins, 1996a; Kruglanski, 1996 for a discussion), those 
in the goal attainable condition would be able to react faster in correctly identifying 
goal-related words than those in the goal unattainable conditione, whereas no 
differences were predicted across condition on the goal-irrelevant words.
Results
          Manipulation checks.  Three manipulation checks were administered to the 
groups at two different settings.  Participants were asked after the goal prime (but 
before the IV attainability prime) how important the goal of accomplishing something 
great with your life was.  While no statistically significant mean differences were 
found between the groups (F(1, 97) = 1.54, p < .21), there was a small nominal gap 
with those in the goal unattainable condition saying the goal was slightly less 
important (mean = 2.10) than those in the goal attainable condition (mean = 1.86; “1” 
was strong agreement on a 1-6 scale).  
     Attainability and progress were both measured after the attainability prime; there 
were no significant differences between the groups in their ratings of how attainable 
their goal was (F (1, 97) = 1.62, p < .207), although the statistically insignificant 
trend was of similar size and direction to the “importance” question asked earlier 
(post-hoc analysis revealed that responses to the importance and attainability 
questions were significantly positively correlated, r (96) = .327, p < .001). 
Replicating a previous finding from Study 3, those in the goal-attainable group 
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reported significantly more perceived progress toward their goal compared to the 
goal-unattainable group (F (1, 96) = 11.16, p < .001). 
     Incomplete data/coding errors.  2 participants had data that were incomplete (they 
had MediaLab entries but not DirectRT entries or vice-versa) or duplicated in one 
program but not the other, and 2 others were excluded because of what looked like 
bimodal response patterns (they averaged 5-600 ms for the first half of the trials and 
900-1100 for the second half); these were not included in the final analysis.  This left 
92 participants available for the final analysis.  
     Primary analysis.  The scores of the 10 goal-related words and the 15 goal-
unrelated words were averaged together to form indices.  Prior to being averaged 
together, all responses that were incorrectly responded to (indicating a word was in 
fact a nonword) were deleted.  To reduce the dataset's expected skew, individual RT 
scores for both innovative and non-innovative words were (natural) log-transformed, 
and any individual datapoint that exceeded three standard deviations from the 
individual's mean was eliminated;  the final mean score indices were then constructed 
and incorporated with the rest of the survey data.
     These indices were then examined in a 2(condition: goal attained vs. unattained) X 
2(word: goal related vs unrelated) repeated measures factorial ANOVA.  The 
resulting interaction term was not significant, F(1, 90) = 2.31, p < .113; this was 
insufficiently strong evidence to support the experimental hypothesis.  There was no 
main effect found for this model, so for the Bayes factor test the interaction term was 
tested against the simple null model, and the resulting ΔBIC = 1.86 made it clear that 
the null hypothesis was more likely than the experimental hypothesis given the data. 
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An analysis of the (insignificantly different)  means revealed that the direction they 
were trending toward was actually opposite of that expected: those in the goal-
unattainable condition identified goal-relevant words (ln = 6.328) faster than the goal-
irrelevant baseline words (ln = 6.345), but those in the goal-attainable condition 
identified goal-relevant words slower (ln = 6.322) than the goal irrelevant baseline (ln 
= 6.311).  Thus, an insufficiently powerful test can be effectively ruled out as a 
possible explanation for why the experiment did not work as hypothesized.
Discussion
     The hypothesis that deactivating the goal of being innovative and accomplished 
would lead to decreased cognitive accessibility of goal-related (but not goal-
unrelated) constructs as measured by reaction times was not supported, and Study 5 
failed to conceptually replicate Study 4 using much of the same procedure. 
Furthermore, the means did not even trend in the predicted direction, suggesting that 
either the results of Study 4 or 5 or both were chance occurrences, or the mechanism 
responsible for the evaluation differences found in Study 4 was simply not capable of 
being tapped by a measure of cognitive accessibility (as measured in Study 5).  The 
cause of this result will be considered further in the General Discussion.
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Chapter 4: Devaluation Due to Goal Undesirability
Study 6
     Research reviewed earlier (e.g. Kruglanski et al., 2002) suggested that there were 
three ways to deactivate a goal: attaining the goal, perceiving the goal to be 
unattainable, and perceiving the goal to be undesirable.  Studies 1-2 were run in an 
attempt to provide evidence for attainment reducing the valuation advantage, while 
Study 3 was an attempt to show this through manipulating the goal's attainability. 
The purpose of Study 6 was to provide evidence for the third way, that lowering the 
desirability of a goal can lower the valuation of means to accomplishing that goal 
without affecting the valuation of goal-irrelevant objects, again using a scenario 
similar to those encountered by shoppers at online retailers such as Amazon.com.  
Method
     Participants.  131 psychology undergraduates at the University of Maryland took 
part in this study for partial course credit.  Recruitment, appointments, and credit 
were handled by the university's online research participation system.      
     Design.  This study utilized a 2(goal: desirable/undesirable) X 2(goal-relevant 
product/goal-irrelevant product) repeated-measures design.  
     Procedure.  Participants were recruited for an ostensibly 2-part “Judgment Study”. 
After being greeted by the experimenter and giving informed consent, participants 
were placed in a cubicle to complete the experiment using MediaLab software. 
Participants were informed that they would take part in two separate experiments, the 
first of which was investigating the relationship between personality types and 
judgment.  After completing a number of personality measures (for the purpose of 
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supporting the cover story), participants were given a short paragraph explaining that 
survey research has consistently found that getting good grades is very important to 
college students (students were subsequently asked as a treatment check how 
important getting good grades is to them personally).  
     Participants were then given the experimental manipulation: those in the goal-
desirable condition were told that other research has found that getting good grades in 
college is correlated with long-term happiness, possibly because college grades are 
also correlated with long-term job salary, security, and choice.  Conversely, those in 
the goal-undesirable condition were told of otherwise identically-worded research 
finding that getting good grades in college is not correlated with long-term happiness, 
possibly because grades are not correlated with long-term job salary, security, and 
choice.  Participants were then asked a treatment check question on how surprising 
this finding is to them; this question was added because pretesting had suggested that 
a number of participants in the goal-undesirable condition were suspicious of what 
they had been told, and this question was an attempt to offer further support for what 
had been said while legitimizing students' surprise.  Following this, both conditions 
were told that  they had completed the “Personality and Honesty” section of the 
session (both to support the “separate studies” cover story and to suggest that the 
participants' honesty was being gauged) and are ready to begin the final section.  
     In this “Judgment” section, the students read another paragraph giving an 
introductory statement about the difficulty that inflation of college costs is posing for 
universities and students alike.  They were further told that “One aspect of college 
cost inflation that has not been well-investigated  is how good students are at 
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shopping for everyday items, which can impact students' living costs.”  This provided 
the ostensible rationale for the task that was to follow.  Participants were then told 
that in the second part of the experiment, they would be looking at pictures of 
products many college students have in their dorm rooms or apartments, and be asked 
to estimate what its price is.  They were told that they would be asked first how much 
they think it retails for, and second how much they personally would be willing to pay 
for it.  
     Participants were then presented with 16 pictures of items, one at a time and in 
randomized order, half of which were instrumental to the goal of being successful 
with classwork (desk lamp, alarm clock, backpack, notebook, calendar, etc.) and half 
of which would not be useful for studying and may even constitute a tempting 
alternative to it (video game console, microwave cookbook, coffee table book about 
beer, board game, etc.).  Each picture initially was presented with the phrase, “Take a 
look at this item”, and then participants were asked what they personally were willing 
to pay for it, followed on the next screen by the true dependent variable, “How much 
do you think this item SHOULD sell for?”.   This cycle repeated for all 16 items. 
After participants had typed in their responses to all questions, they were fully 
debriefed, thanked for their participation, and credited for the session.  Unlike in 
previous studies, participants were not asked to voice suspicions about this study 
during the debrief. This was because pretesting had found suspicions to be quite 
common, necessitating a change in tactic: the “how surprised were you” treatment 
check question was added in hopes of it being both an indicator of suspicion as well 
as a means for defusing suspicion (when combined with the “Honesty and 
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Personality” study labeling) prior to the measurement of the dependent variable. 
Including a suspicion check would have likely yielded redundant data with the 
existing item or even caused an increase in false alarms. 
     It was predicted that the studying-related (goal relevant) items would be evaluated 
more positively for those in the goal-desirable condition than for those in the goal-
undesirable condition, whereas the non-studying-related items will be evaluated 
equally between the two conditions.
Results
     Preliminary analyses of treatment/suspicion checks.  All participants responded 
that getting good grades was of at least moderately high importance to them, so none 
were excluded from further analyses on this basis.  The question of how surprised 
participants were to hearing about the purported relationship (or lack thereof) was 
analyzed.  Large differences in self-rated surprise were found: of 66 participants 
assigned to the goal-desirable condition, 54 rated themselves as not surprised (a 1-3 
on a 6-pt. Likert scale), but of the 65 assigned to the goal-undesirable condition, only 
30 rated themselves as not surprised.  This preliminary evidence is suggestive that the 
attempt to defuse suspicion about the undesirability of good college grades using the 
surprise question was largely unsuccessful.
     Primary analyses.  All participants were retained in the initial analysis.  The goal-
consistent items (desk lamp, alarm clock, backpack, notebook, calendar) and goal-
inconsistent items (video game console, microwave cookbook, coffee table book 
about beer, board game) were averaged together to form two indices. These two 
indices were examined using a 2(condition: goal desirable/undesirable) X 2(item: 
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goal consistent/inconsistent) factorial ANOVA.  An insignificant interaction was 
found, F(1, 129) = .201, p < .655, suggesting that the pattern of means did not differ 
as a function of condition, and  the experimental hypothesis was not supported.
     A second analysis was run using all participants who responded that they were not 
surprised in the manipulation check (1-3; the purported link/lack of link between 
grades and happiness).  Another 2 X 2 factorial ANOVA was run, and the interaction 
term was still not significant, F(1, 82) = 2.47, p < .12 (the ΔBIC = 1.93, which still 
solidly favored rejecting the interaction model and retaining the main effects-only 
model instead; the fundamental conclusion of the study did not change).  Yet due to 
the large difference between conditions on the number of unsurprised participants 
retained, even these nominal valuation differences cannot be causally attributed solely 
to the experimental manipulation.  An analysis of the (insignificantly different) means 
did at least find them trending toward a pattern similar to that predicted by the theory: 
those in the goal-desirable condition valued the goal-relevant items ($12.67) 
nominally more than those in the undesirable condition ($12.34), while the goal-
irrelevant items (which could potentially have even been seen as temptations to the 
goal) were nominally valued more by those in the goal-undesirable condition ($40.57) 
than those in the goal desirable condition ($39.94).
Discussion
     The 6th study attempted unsuccessfully to provide evidence that reducing the 
desirability of a goal would lead to goal deactivation and subsequent devaluation of 
objects related to the goal.  The lack of success in this endeavor may be attributable to 
an insufficiently believable manipulation of goal desirability (that getting good grades 
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in school is/is not related to long-term happiness).  This problem was first identified 
during pretesting, and persisted in the regular experiment despite attempts to mitigate 
it with changes to the experimental procedure.  A post-hoc analysis excluding those 
who found the experimental manipulation surprising (or potentially unbelievable) did 
find a pattern of means that were insignificant but trending in the direction predicted . 
However, both the substantial number of those who reported surprise and the 
asymmetry between experimental conditions leave open the possibility that even 
these trends were due to personological factors, not due to the experimental 
manipulation.
Study 7: The effect of goal desirability on school product valuations
     Study 6 attempted unsuccessfully to demonstrate that lowering the desirability of a 
background goal would lead to lower valuation of objects that were instrumental in 
accomplishing that goal, while evaluations of goal-neutral products would not be 
affected.  The reason for the lack of success in this endeavor can be plausibly 
attributed to a manipulation that was not believable to a large segment of the the 
experimental condition.  Study 7 sought to rectify this problem by having students 
themselves generate reasons why a goal is desirable vs. reasons why a goal could be 
undesirable, in which the latter would dilute the goal's overall desirability.  The 
hypothesis and basic methodology of Study 6 were otherwise retained.
Method
     Participants.  237 psychology undergraduates at the University of Maryland took 
part in this study for either partial course credit or as an uncredited in-class learning 
experience (the decision to assign course credit was made at the discretion of the 
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instructor).  Classrooms sampled included two sections of a research methods course, 
a psychology of close relationships course, and a consumer psychology course. 
     Design.  This study utilized a 2(goal: desirable/undesirable) X 2(goal-relevant 
product/goal-irrelevant product) repeated-measures design.  
     Procedure.  This study was conducted as a series of classroom surveys.  At the 
beginning of the period, the course instructor introduced the experimenter, who told 
the students that they were taking part in a survey that contained two separate studies. 
The first study would investigate the relationship between personality and goal 
construal, while the second was introduced as “an evaluation task which is the control 
condition for an online study that we have not been able to recruit enough participants 
for” using the psychology department's recruiting system (no such study existed, but 
all students would have been familiar with the online survey system referenced). 
Further, in an effort to ensure that they were motivated to be accurate, participants 
were told that they would be given the “correct” answers for the evaluation task after 
completing the experiment.  Participants indicated informed consent, were given 15 
minutes to complete the survey, and were then fully debriefed and thanked for their 
participation.
     The survey itself consisted of a title page reaffirming the cover story given 
verbally before the class, followed by the Promotion/Prevention Scale (Lockwood, 
Jordan, & Kunda, 2002).  The third page asked a goal treatment check question, 
“Most college students would agree that doing well in school is important to them.  Is 
success in school important to you?” (1-7 Likert scale with Unimportant/Very 
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Important as the endpoints).  Students in the desirable goal condition then read the 
following:
In this study we are interested in the “complete spectrum” of what 
students think about when they consider their goals.  Please list as 
many positive (good/happy) consequences or implications of 
(resulting from) you being successful in school.  List and number these 
in the space below:
Students in the undesirable goal condition read the same statement, but listing 
negative (bad/unhappy) things instead.  The number of things the students listed 
(either positive or negative) was recorded, and students then moved on to the second 
“study” in the survey package.
     Since this study was the last chronologically to run of the 7 in this package and 
since there was no way to exclude participants from “signing up” for this study if they 
had participated in a similar one before, the instructions on the next page read:
Thanks, you have completed the first study!  The second survey is 
adapted from a lab study on students’ consumer price estimations for 
everyday products, but we need more participants in order to complete 
the study.  If you have already done this study in the lab last semester, 
please indicate that on the last page of the survey but still do the 
questions! (we can still use them in a cross-validation analysis).
For added fun, when the class is finished with the survey, the 
experimenter will tell you the correct answers so you can see how 
close you were!
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(Hint: most of the items do not have “regular” prices like “$29.99”) 
     Participants then saw pictures of 8 total items, four of which had been pretested to 
be helpful in succeeding at school (a notebook, alarm clock, Post-It Notes, and 
focus/memory pills) while the other four were pretested as not being helpful (a tour 
book of Washington, D.C. attractions, a board game, balance ball, and book of Mad 
Libs).  Each picture was preceded by the question, “How much do you think this 
(insert product description) retails for on Amazon.com?”, with a answer line 
formatted as “$___.___” next to the item.  Since this was a survey it was not possible 
to completely randomize the items, although an attempt to control order effects was 
made in that two versions of each survey condition were distributed.  Items that were 
presented  in the 1, 2, 7, & 8 spots in one version were presented in the middle four 
spots in the second version.  Following the final item, participants were asked, “What 
do you think these studies were about?  (List separately if applicable)”, and students 
were given about 1/3 sheet of paper to write their possible suspicions.  
Results
     Preliminary analyses.  The goal treatment checks were examined to ensure all 
participants did indicate that school success was an important goal.  All responses 
were either a “6” or “7”, indicating high importance.  The suspicion checks were also 
examined to see if any participants mentioned concerns that the “separate” studies 
were not in fact unrelated or if thinking about school was expected to influence price 
estimates in any way.  Additionally, if a student indicated he/she had taken this (or a 
similar) study before, this was also grounds for exclusion from the final analysis.  In 
all, 37 of the 237 participants were excluded from the final analysis for one of these 
51
three reasons.  While this number looks large, it is not surprising seeing as some 
participants had likely participated in one of the other 6 studies in this package, while 
students in the research methods course appeared to be suspicious of the unrelated-
experiments cover story at a higher rate (not statistically tested) than the other two 
classes.  200 participants were retained for the final analysis.
     Score transformation.  The final goal of this analysis was to combine the school-
relevant and school-irrelevant items into a two mean indices which could be subjected 
to a repeated-measures ANOVA.  However, simply combining the raw scores 
generated by participants would be problematic for two reasons.  First, some products 
would have far more influence on the index than other products (a notebook whose 
predicted price averaged barely over a dollar compared to a $20-30 alarm clock) due 
to their higher price variability in dollars.  Second, outliers within the dataset for each 
product would also enjoy outsized influence on the mean relative to more typical 
responses.  To mitigate both of these problems, prices for each product were sorted 
and rank-ordered in a stepwise fashion (so if $5.99 was the 8th-highest price for an 
item and 4 people listed $5.99, all participants who listed $6.00 would get a ranking 
of 9 as opposed to 12).
     Primary analysis.  The rank-ordered scores for the four school-relevant items and 
the four school-irrelevant items were combined into separate indices.  These two 
indices were examined using a 2(condition: goal desirable/undesirable) X 2(item: 
goal relevant/irrelevant) factorial ANOVA.  An insignificant interaction was found, 
F(1, 198) = .569, p < .452 (ΔBIC = 4.97), suggesting strongly that the pattern of 
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means did not differ as a function of condition, and  the experimental hypothesis was 
not supported.
     Secondary analyses.  To fully investigate this 200-participant sample, a number of 
additional exploratory analyses were run.  First, the pattern of relationships as a 
function of condition for all the individual products' ratings were examined using a 
Spearman correlation with the condition variable.  No significant differences found 
between condition for any product individually ( all ρ < .1, with  p > .3 for one and p 
>. 5 for all others).  Second, a “Strength” of desirability variable was computed by 
effect coding the condition (as a -1 or +1) and multiplying it by the number of 
positive/negative consequences or implications of the goal listed by the participant. 
This analysis assumed that those who wrote a greater number of things about why the 
goal was (un)desirable would find the goal more (un)desirable overall.  This strength 
variable was then used instead of the condition as the predictor in a correlation with 
all the individual products.  The results were the same as those found for the 
dichotomous condition variable: ρ < .1 for all 8 products, with no p < .26.  Post-hoc 
analyses were not performed on the 37 participants excluded due to suspicion, 
because many of them had an idea of what the study's hypothesis was and thus any 
conclusions drawn from such data could not be experimentally valid.
Discussion
     Study 7 attempted unsuccessfully to provide evidence that reducing the 
desirability of a goal would lead to goal deactivation and subsequent devaluation of 
objects related to the goal.  Unlike Study 6, the lack of success in this endeavor 
cannot be attributed either to an insufficiently believable manipulation of goal 
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desirability (participants generated their own examples of (un)desirability in this 
survey) or to a lack of statistical power (the final analysis used 200 participants' 
entries).  Furthermore, post-hoc analyses found that the number of 
desirable/undesirable implications of the goal listed did not predict any differences by 
condition.  However, it is not clear that the experimental manipulation actually did 
cause a meaningful change in the goal's desirability, since including a manipulation 
check would have likely alerted participants to the true nature of the study.  Future 
research on this topic could use a different goal that is not so uniformly and highly 
desirable to college students as an operationalization of the independent variable 
(such as dieting or exercise).  This study did not support the theory that reducing a 
goal's desirability would lead to a decrease in the price valuation of goal-relevant (but 
not goal-irrelevant) items.
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Chapter 5:  General Discussion and Implications
General Discussion
     Seven studies attempted to provide evidence that deactivating a background goal 
would cause devaluation of objects that were relevant to the goal, even though they 
were being ostensibly evaluated based on a criteria unrelated to the goal.  The 
theoretical rationale behind this prediction was based on an application of the 
multifinality principle to the task of price estimation: a background goal (such as the 
motivation to affiliate with an important group) can unconsciously influence the 
evaluations of items that are potentially relevant (means) to the goal's 
accomplishment, even when the item's evaluation is supposed to be based on a 
different, focal goal (making an accurate, unbiased judgment in this case).  The case 
was further made that not only should the activation of a background goal cause an 
increase in the item's price valuation, but that the deactivation of that goal would 
result in the loss of this valuation premium.  Three mechanisms were suggested that 
should cause goal deactivation: attaining the goal, making the goal appear 
unattainable, and making the goal appear undesirable.  Support for the theory under 
investigation provided by these studies was mixed, although not equally so for each 
of the mechanisms; the evidence for each mechanism will be reviewed in order 
following the general review of studies.  Study 1 obtained evidence that attainment of 
an affiliation goal caused devaluation of a goal-relevant sweatshirt (but not a neutral, 
goal-irrelevant sweatshirt) relative to those those who had not attained the affiliation 
goal and thus had it still active.  Study 2 was a successful conceptual replication of 
Study 1, replicating its procedure using a reaction-timed lexical decision task replaced 
55
consumer product valuations.  Study 2 demonstrated greater activation (and thus 
faster reaction times) for goal-relevant words when the goal had not been attained vs. 
after it had been attained.  The hypothesis was supported using both conventional and 
Bayesian statistical methods.  Study 3 attempted to provide further evidence for goal 
attainment causing devaluation of goal-relevant items using the person goal of 
success and stocks of companies that were expected to differ in their future success; 
however, Study 3 failed to provide support the experimental hypothesis.  Study 4 
obtained evidence consistent with the hypothesis that perceiving a goal as 
unattainable caused goal-relevant (but not goal-irrelevant) mutual funds to be 
devalued relative to those who had the goal still attainable and active.  Furthermore, 
evaluations from those whose background goal had been deactivated were nearly 
identical to those who had not had the goal primed in the first place, offering further 
evidence for the theory.   Study 5 was a conceptual replication of the successful Study 
4, replicating Study 4's procedure until the sector mutual fund valuation task was 
replaced by the reaction-timed lexical decision task.  It was predicted that those in the 
goal-attainable condition would respond to goal-related words (but not goal-
unrelated) faster than those whose goal had been presented as unattainable.  This 
hypothesis was not supported by the data obtained.  Study 6 attempted unsuccessfully 
to demonstrate that lowering the desirability of a goal (getting good grades in college) 
would lead to devaluation of goal-relevant school supplies but not goal-irrelevant 
entertainment and leisure items.  Analysis of the manipulation check, considered with 
a pretested earlier version of the study, suggested that the null result may have been a 
result of an insufficiently believable experimental manipulation.  Study 7 attempted 
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unsuccessfully to show what Study 6 could not: that lowering the desirability of the 
goal of school success would cause decreased valuations of products related to school 
success, but not products unrelated to school success.  An analysis of over 200 
participants in this study did not reveal any statistically significant trends whatsoever, 
failing to support the hypothesis.  
Deactivation and devaluation as a function of goal attainment.     
     Three studies investigated the hypothesis that attainment of a background goal 
would cause a devaluation of goal-relevant items but not goal-irrelevant.  Study 1 was 
successful in demonstrating this, that attainment of an affiliation goal led to 
devaluation of a University of Maryland sweatshirt (vs. goal unattainment), but not a 
neutral sweatshirt.  Study 2 conceptually replicated this finding, using a reaction time 
task to demonstrate that goal-relevant words were recognized faster (relative to 
neutral word baseline) by those who had not attained the goal than those who had 
attained the goal; this is evidence that attainment of the goal had in fact lowered its 
cognitive activation, further supporting the predicted model of goal systems theory. 
In addition, these studies provide evidence consistent with the existing literature 
suggesting that even vicarious goal fulfillment can lead to goal deactivation (Orehek, 
2006; Wilcox, Vallen, Block, & Fitzsimons, 2009).  Studies 1 and 2 together offer 
strong converging evidence that background goal attainment does in fact lower its 
cognitive activation, resulting in the valuation advantage of goal-consistent means to 
be lost or reduced.
     Study 3 did not work as predicted, although it is far from clear that its results 
should be interpreted as evidence against the theory in question.  Study 3 attempted to 
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demonstrate that vicarious goal attainment (listing a time when one was personally 
successful vs. unsuccessful at an important goal) would reduce the premium placed 
on the stock shares of companies that were expected to be highly successful (large 
growth) in the near future relative to companies that were not expected to be 
successful (no growth or negative growth).  While this result did not materialize, the 
lack of any significant interaction term obtained, in combination with the 
overwhelming effect size of the stimulus type main effect (almost 66% of the 
variance explained in the experiment vs. less than 1% for the nominal interaction), 
suggest that there was likely little room for a motivational bias to manifest itself in 
this experiment.  Just as no (group affiliation) motivational bias was found in Chun & 
Kruglanski's (2005) cola taste test experiment when one cola clearly tasted better than 
the others, the success background goal in this experiment may not have been able to 
make an impact when the criteria of future growth expectations (which is a highly 
applicable criteria for stock valuation under the focal accuracy goal) was so 
unambiguous.  Furthermore, since no manipulation check was used in this study (due 
to it being a survey packet which could be flipped backward), it is not clear that the 
goal manipulation was successfully manipulated or was sufficiently strong to cause 
the desired effect.
     In summary, two of the three studies yielded the results predicted by the theory, 
while the third showed a very strong main effect that (consistent with prior research 
on this theory) could have precluded the influence of a motivational bias from 
manifesting.  Overall, these results are supportive of the theory in general and the 
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mechanism in particular: that attainment of a background goal causes its deactivation, 
and thus potential means to the goal are devalued.    
Deactivation and devaluation as a function of goal unattainability
     Two studies investigated the hypothesis that presenting evidence of a goal's 
unattainability would lead to goal deactivation and thus devaluation of goal-relevant 
items but not goal-irrelevant ones.  Study 4 was successful in demonstrating this: 
those who had the goal of doing something great and innovative with their lives 
appear unattainable did not overvalue (relative to those to whom the goal was 
attainable) stock funds of industry sectors that had been pretested as highly 
innovative.  This difference was not due to a main effect of overvaluation; funds of 
non-innovative sectors did not differ between conditions.  Furthermore, a third 
condition who had never had the innovativeness goal primed in the first place did not 
differ in either prediction from the goal unattainable condition, but differed from the 
goal attainable condition only in that the innovative sectors were valued less (see 
Figure 4).  This was the strongest evidence supporting the theoretical predictions that 
could be obtained from this experiment.  Study 5 was intended to be a conceptual 
replication of Study 4, using its exact methodology up until the point when stock 
sector funds were about to be valued.  In its place, participants in Study 5 completed a 
lexical decision task that was designed to measure the activation of “innovative” 
words relative to neutral baseline words.  It was predicted that those in the goal 
unattainable condition would deactivate the goal, leading to slower reaction times for 
the innovative words (relative to the neutral word baseline) compared to those in the 
goal attainable condition.  This prediction was not actuated empirically; no significant 
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differences (interaction p < .11) were found between the two conditions, and an 
analysis of the condition*stimulus type means found that those in the goal 
unattainable condition responded to the innovative words nominally faster than those 
in the goal attainable condition (compared to neutral word baseline).  This means that 
the experimental hypothesis did not fail to be supported due to a lack of statistical 
power.
     There are a number of possible reasons why Study 5 did not replicate the results of 
Study 4 as predicted.   The first reason is that the finding of Study 4 was merely a 
Type 1 error, and would not have been replicated had the procedure been followed 
exactly.  While acknowledging that this is a possibility, the mean differences obtained 
would only happen very infrequently due to chance alone (p < .015), and the BIC 
criteria strongly supported inclusion of the interaction term in question (ΔBIC = 
-4.12).  Furthermore, the results of Study 5, while not statistically significant, were 
actually trending in the opposite direction of that predicted, suggesting the failure to 
support the experimental hypothesis was not a lack of power.  Thus, it appears 
unlikely that the results obtained for both experiments were statistical noise that need 
not be dealt with; the more plausible conclusion is that the (nearly) identical 
experimental procedure affected the price valuation dependent variable and reaction 
time variable in different ways or to different extents.  These studies had been run 
assuming that goal activation was the direct cause of the valuation bias demonstrated 
in Studies 1 and 4, but none of the studies conclusively demonstrated this (although 
the evidence obtained from the replication of Study 1, Study 2, was supportive of this 
mechanism).  In order to test whether the experimental manipulation (goal 
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unattainability) affected goal activation and valuation to different extents, a future 
replication would need to be run combining both Studies 4 and 5 (run simultaneously, 
drawing from the same sample pool) in order to establish that valuation and activation 
were in fact differentially affected.  If it was found that valuation and activation were 
(once again) differentially affected, future experiments could test the possible reasons 
for why this was.         
     One possible explanation for the discrepant findings is that the unattainability 
manipulation caused frustration and negative affect toward the innovativeness goal 
while increasing the activation of the goal construct itself in the near term.  A similar 
motivational mechanism has been observed in the animal learning literature on 
operant extinction.  When a previously reinforced behavior ceases to be reinforced 
(operant extinction), eventually the behavior will be reduced; the near-term 
consequences of extinction, however, are an “extinction burst” (a sharp increase of 
reinforcement-seeking behavior) and frustration (see Lerman & Iwata, 1995; Harris, 
Pentel, & LeSage, 2007).  Furthermore, this behavior has been observed not only in 
rats but in human participants in clinical trials (Lerman & Iwata, 1995).  Thus, if 
participants were given evidence that a goal they held was unattainable, they could 
experience negative affect toward the goal itself (which would be responsible for the 
devaluation of innovative sector mutual funds) while the goal itself would experience 
a “burst” of high activation for a short time before eventual deactivation.  To test this 
possible explanation, research would have to be conducted that would exactly 
replicate Study 5 (the RT study) while varying the amount of time elapsed from the 
unattainability manipulation to the reaction time task.  If there was evidence of an 
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“extinction curve” of goal activation for the goal unattainable condition but not for 
the goal attainable condition, the explanation proposed in this paragraph would be 
supported.
     Another explanation for the discrepant findings of Studies 4 and 5 is simple 
reactance.  Under this hypothesis, participants in the goal unattainable condition did 
initially deactivate their innovativeness goal after receiving evidence of its 
unattainability.  Those in Study 4 went on to evaluate sector funds that did not 
blatantly prime their recently-deactivated goal, resulting in an evaluation of those 
sectors that was not upwardly biased (compared to those in the goal-attainable 
condition).  Those in Study 5, on the other hand, completed a lexical decision task 
where words that were very similar to the goal they had been told was not attainable 
(“Innovative”, “Pioneer”) were the focal stimuli that they were being asked to 
respond to.  It is possible that those in Study 5 experienced psychological reactance 
(Brehm, 1966) regarding the goal (that was only considered unattainable because 
some experiment had produced historical evidence suggesting an unfavorable 
comparison).  This perceived attack on personal freedom would have caused a 
vigorous re-adoption of the goal at a much higher level of activation than it had been 
prior to the unattainability manipulation, which manifested itself in faster recognition 
of goal-relevant words for those in the unattainable condition vs. attainable.  To test 
this possible hypothesis, the lexical decision task of Study 5 could be constructively 
replicated.  Half of the participants would be assigned to conditions exactly mirroring 
those of Study 5.  The other half would replicate the first half of the experiment, but 
participate in a lexical decision task that had been modified in order to make the goal 
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words more subtly presented and thus less likely to cause reactance.  This lexical 
decision task would supraliminally present only nonwords and neutral words, instead 
of the nonwords, neutral words, and goal words that had been shown originally. 
However, half of the neutral words would be preceded by a subliminal goal word, 
while half of the neutral words would be preceded by other neutral words.  If those in 
the goal unattainable condition responded faster to the goal-primed words than the 
neutral-primed words (relative to those in the attainable condition) only when the goal 
words were presented supraliminally, this would be evidence of a reactance effect.
     One final explanation for the results obtained in Studies 4 and 5 involves the role 
of goal progress and commitment in goal pursuit.  Research on self-regulation has 
discovered that when multiple goals are active, progress on any one goal can result in 
in either decreased or increased activation of that goal based on whether the progress 
is interpreted as mere progress (partial goal attainment) or as commitment to the goal 
(see Fishbach & Dhar, 2008, p.618-9 for a discussion).  A similar interpretative 
mechanism could be at work in Studies 4 and 5; it was noted in the Results sections 
of both Studies 4 and 5 that the manipulation check of perceived goal progress did 
find that those in the attainable condition reported higher progress toward their goal. 
How progress was interpreted may not have factored heavily into the results of Study 
4 because the attainability manipulation was strong enough to cause the predicted 
effect.  This scenario would have been initially repeated in Study 5, however, the 
presentation of the goal words during the reaction time task may have caused a new 
increase in goal construct activation that was interpreted differently across conditions. 
For those in the goal unattainable condition, an higher level of activation for a goal 
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that less progress had been made on could be interpreted as commitment to the goal, 
subsequently raising the activation of the goal enough to show a faster reaction time 
for goal words on the remaining trials.  For those in the goal attainable condition, 
activation of a goal that progress had been made on (at least comparatively) could 
have been interpreted as sufficient progress to pursue another goal, causing goal 
deactivation and slower reaction times for goal words on the remaining trials.
     In summary, it is not clear at this time why the results of Studies 4 and 5 diverged. 
Study 4 did produce results that were consistent with goal systems theory, but the 
results of Study 5 call into question the psychological mechanism that produced these 
Study 4's results.  Several possible explanations exist that can explain this 
discrepancy, and a substantial future program of research will be required to 
satisfactorily determine its true cause.
Deactivation and devaluation as a function of goal undesirability
     Two studies investigated the hypothesis that undesirability of a goal would lead to 
deactivation of the goal and thus devaluation of goal-relevant (but not goal-irrelevant) 
items.  Studies 6 and 7 sought unsuccessfully to demonstrate this effect using the goal 
of school success for the independent variable and consumer product pictures (from 
Amazon.com) of items that were or were not instrumental to success in school.  Study 
6 manipulated goal desirability by presenting a (bogus) research finding to students 
whose main conclusion was that school success was/was not correlated with long-
term happiness.  While no significant differences were found between the conditions 
on how goal-relevant or goal-irrelevant products' prices were estimated, a treatment 
check of self-reported surprise did suggest that a large number of students in the goal 
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undesirable condition may not have believed the experimental manipulation (this was 
a problem that had been identified during pretesting and attempts had been made to 
mitigate this problem for the actual study).  As a result, Study 7 was run using similar 
methodology but this time allowing participants to generate positive or negative 
implications of being successful in school. This manipulation was intended to cause 
the desired end-state of the goal to be associated with more vs. less positive affect 
when it was considered (evidence of goal desirability), while also solving the 
believability problem from the previous version of the experiment.  Unfortunately, 
Study 4b did not produce significant effects or even meaningful but insignificant 
trends in the data for even any single product, despite having 200 participants' 
responses for the final analysis.  Both studies failed to produce statistically significant 
results of any kind, and thus failed to support the experimental hypothesis.
     The most logical criticism to make of these studies is that their methodology did 
not lend itself to obtaining significant results.  Most prominently, the goal of school 
success is likely not a good candidate when searching for a goal to render less 
desirable.  While this is a goal that all of our participants apparently shared, the fact 
that they were students at a major university suggests that they have a successful 
history of defending this goal's desirability when confronted with temptations.  A 
more malleable goal, or a laboratory-task specific goal, may be more useful in future 
attempts to demonstrate this effect.  Future research investigating this phenomenon 
may benefit from using a modified evaluative conditioning framework (DeHouwer, 
Thomas, &  Bayens, 2001) in the laboratory to render a goal more or less desirable. 
The present research sought to maximize ecological validity by convincing students 
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through arguments that a long-term goal was less desirable than had been earlier 
thought; given the lack of success of this manipulation, however, a simple laboratory 
conditioning task may allow for the most powerful experimental test.  Furthermore, 
the lack of a manipulation check in the final in-class survey study (an attempt to 
minimize the possibility of participants guessing the nature of the experiment) leaves 
open the possibility that the manipulation was not successful at all.  Due to the 
difficulty in conclusively interpreting null results, making a firm theoretical 
conclusion for or against the theory being tested on the basis of these results is not 
warranted.  It should be noted that, as with the results of Study 3, failure to 
demonstrate a motivational bias in one context is not strong evidence that it does not 
or cannot exist.
Conclusions
     The purpose of the present research was to investigate an implication of goal 
systems theory, that deactivating a background goal would cause devaluation of 
objects that were relevant to the goal.  Three mechanisms were suggested that should 
cause goal deactivation: goal attainment, perceived goal unattainability, and 
perceived goal undesirability.  Evidence supporting the first mechanism, goal 
attainment, was obtained first using a consumer product pricing task, and second later 
conceptually replicated using a reaction time task to determine that price differences 
were in fact due to differences in goal activation.  This tenet of the theory was 
supported.  Evidence supporting the second mechanism, goal unattainability, was 
obtained in a sector mutual fund price estimation task; however both the manipulation 
check of attainability and the conceptual replication using a reaction time task failed 
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to support the theory, suggesting that while the motivational bias on pricing did exist, 
the mechanism proposed by this theory (evaluative bias due to goal deactivation) was 
not necessarily an accurate picture of what happened in the experiment.  A 
considerable amount of future research (some ideas are proposed above) will be 
required in order to conclusively demonstrate how this mechanism works.  Evidence 
supporting the third mechanism, goal undesirability, was not obtained.  Two 
experiments attempted to demonstrate this effect using a school success goal and 
school-related consumer products; the first experiment had an insufficiently 
believable manipulation, while the second showed no experimental effects on price 
estimation whatsoever.  These experiments likely failed due to methodological 
reasons, so no conclusion regarding the theory is warranted from these experiments.
Implications
     The results of these experiments have two very clear and important implications 
for contemporary society.  The first implication is that the activation of background 
goals can influence “fair market” price estimations.  This is an important point to 
make because the existing goals literature deals mostly with differences in choice of 
means as a result of goal activation, not means valuation as demonstrated here (see 
Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007, for a review).  It is worth noting that in Study 4, not only 
were the (goal-relevant) innovative sector funds overvalued by those in the goal 
attainable condition relative to the goal unattainable condition, the funds were 
overvalued relative to the no goal primed condition as well.  There is little reason to 
doubt that the mechanism behind this contrast was indeed the higher activation of the 
(recently primed) innovativeness goal for those in the goal attainable condition. 
67
Given that a goal can be primed through any means to its accomplishment or any 
related cognitive construct, this finding introduces the possibility of variable fair-
market price estimates for many different products.  This finding has many possible 
applications in consumer psychology, including advertising (especially before or at 
the point of price evaluation) and flexible pricing plans (in some markets it is typical 
for purchases to be made well in advance of consumption, such as in the tourism and 
transportation industries).  Future research in this vein could investigate not only 
customers' valuations of goal-consistent objects but their willingness to buy them, 
seeing as the present research did not address this question at all.  
     Many applications of this finding exist in markets where prices are flexibly 
determined in real-time through auctions as well (e.g., financial markets or eBay).  In 
fact, the particular goal and means used in Study 4 (innovativeness goal and 
stereotypically innovative industry sectors) were an intentional attempt to illustrate a 
possible cause of a demonstrated market inefficiency: the “value premium”.  The 
value premium refers to the finding that between the years 1926-2004, a portfolio of 
value stocks (those with large earnings relative to their “lower” current price) have 
outperformed growth stocks (those with low earnings relative to “higher” current 
price; see Fama & French, 1992).  Conventional risk-based asset pricing models 
cannot account for this finding (Fama & French, 2006; Jegadeesh, 1992), nor can 
consumption-based conceptualizations of risk (value stocks perform as well or better 
than growth stocks during bear markets when cash is more likely to be needed; see 
Lakonishok, Schleifer, & Vishny, 2005, p.304).  Much of this “value premium” can 
however be explained by behavioral (psychological) explanations such as 
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expectational errors for future corporate growth (Lakonishok et al., 2005) or the price 
“momentum effect” whereby price movement in the recent past is extrapolated into 
future price expectations (Lakonishok et al., 2005; see Jegadeesh & Titman, 2005 for 
a recent discussion on momentum effects).
     The present research illustrates the possibility of a motivational explanation for the 
value premium as well.  Growth stocks are typically those companies seen as the 
most innovative in their fields (thus the expectation of future growth that warrants 
them having a higher price relative to current earnings).  This can be due to either an 
innovative product (Apple's iPhone) or an innovative business process (Wal-Mart's 
highly-efficient supply and distribution network).  This innovative quality could 
cause growth stocks to be evaluated as particularly attractive investments to those 
who have the (background) goal of being innovative or accomplishing something 
“groundbreaking”.  If this were true, the prices on growth stocks would be chronically 
bid up above the market value that would justify their current earnings, relative to 
market value for the less-innovative value stocks; value stocks would thus generate a 
chronically better return on initial investment than growth stocks, matching the 
finding of Fama & French (1992).
     Study 4 reports findings that match this predicted scenario.  The 7 pretested 
“innovative” (growth) sectors were in fact generally less mature industries classifiable 
as growth sectors due to their high price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio (information 
technology, internet companies, biotechnology, entertainment, pharmaceuticals, 
computers, and consumer electronics).  Similarly, the pretested “non-innovative” 
(value) sectors tended to be more mature industries with less room for growth and 
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thus lower P/E ratios in real life (banks, retailers, homebuilders, groceries, healthcare, 
insurance, and waste management).    The results of Study 3 were as predicted; those 
with the goal of innovativeness active showed a greater valuation gap favoring the 
innovative/growth sectors over the non-innovative/value sectors than did those who 
had the goal deactivated or those who never had the goal active in the first place.  If 
this experiment generalized to real-world markets, it would produce the chronic 
overvaluation and thus underperformance of growth stocks relative to value stocks. 
     The potential to find motivational biases in stock markets is not restricted to “non-
innovative” value stocks.  Researchers have known for some time the psychological 
benefits of being one of the “good guys” or being on the “winning” team (Cialdini, 
1976); ownership of stock shares of innovative companies could confer this “reflected 
glory” benefit (another direction for future research).  Indeed, research demonstrating 
a chronic devaluation of stocks from “shunned” industries (tobacco, alcohol, 
gambling, firearms, & defense; see Statman & Glushkov, 2008) raises the possibility 
that investors could avoid these companies in order to avoid “basking in reflected 
shame”.
       The second implication of the present research is that not only can priming of a 
background goal cause its activation and thus price valuation biases, but that 
attainment of this goal will result in the deactivation of this goal, eliminating or 
attenuating the overvaluation that had previously existed.  This is a genuine advance 
in the literature on motivation; it shows how motivated biases go away, adding to the 
existing literature explaining how they come in being.  Applications for this finding 
are plentiful as well.  One example in financial markets is that an investment analyst 
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could become hungry around lunchtime, causing a set of grocery or restaurant stocks 
to become overvalued in his/her estimation relative to how they would have been 
estimated had the goal not been active.  According to this research, satiating the 
hunger should result in diminishing this overvaluation; an estimate prior to lunch at 
11:45 may be higher than is typical, but the (lower) estimate at 1:00pm following 
lunch may not differ from an estimate at 9:30am following breakfast..  While the first 
implication discussed in this section opens the floodgates of goal-induced mispricing, 
this second implication contains a method to get rid of the bias.
     A final noteworthy aspect of this implication is its re-affirmation of the power of 
vicarious goal attainment.  Recent research has shown that the mere act of promising 
to complete a goal can result in its deactivation (Orehek, 2006), that the presence and 
momentary contemplation of a healthy food option on a restaurant menu can 
ironically increase indulgence in unhealthy entrees (Wilcox, Vallen, Block, & 
Fitzsimmons, 2009), and that merely making a choice that is seen as pursuing one 
goal can be a “license” to pursue a competing goal that undermines the original 
choice (Khan & Dhar, 2006).  The present research has demonstrated a similar 
finding, that merely thinking about an important group can cause an affiliation goal to 
be vicariously attained and deactivated (Studies 1 and 2).
     In summary, the findings of the present research on motivation, though in need of 
further investigations could have important implications for both motivational theory 
as well as consumer and market behavior.  As such, it suggests incorporating recent 
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